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EYOND question, the advent and virtual explosion of the In-
ternet into the lives of people across the world rank among the
most significant phenomena of recent years. The attendant pos-
sibilities and opportunities know only the uncharted boundaries of
"cyberspace." Much good has already resulted. After all, the world has
been wrapped in a "world wide web" of shared information and near-
real-time communications.
Of course, the seemingly boundless opportunities of the Internet have
not gone unnoticed by thoughtful businesspeople. In fact, one is increas-
ingly hard-pressed to find a business enterprise-from the corporate gi-
ant to the "mom and pop" corner shop-without its own web page. The
Internet, like no pre-existing medium of communication, offers seemingly
unlimited, affordable advertising and marketing opportunities.
But vice inevitably follows hard upon the heels of virtue. While the
Internet provides opportunities to globally network one's business, it also
provides opportunities to wrongfully usurp the identity, reputation and
good will of someone else's business. In particular, the Internet provides
new guises for an old vice: trademark infringement.
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As a result, the new world of e-commerce poses twin threats to busi-
nesses seeking to protect-and to disseminate-trademarked intellectual
property. Even businesses that do not advertise or transact business via
the Internet face the first threat: that Internet users will infringe upon
their trademarked property. But those businesses that do venture into
cyberspace encounter a second threat: that they will-intentionally, inad-
vertently, or even just allegedly-infringe upon the trademarked prop-
erty of another.
This Article focuses on businesses accused of Internet-related trade-
mark infringement. More specifically, it focuses on whether those busi-
nesses may have-or can get-liability insurance coverage for such
claims. As this Article explains, policyholders' optimism in the face of
trademark infringement claims is often justified. Yet, the quest for cover-
age in this context is rendered more difficult by the fact that the language
of liability insurance policies, and the laws interpreting it, are at least a
step (if not a full lap) behind the technology driving Internet advances.
The point of this Article is to walk policyholders and their attorneys
through the basics of this technological, contractual, and legal quagmire.
Toward that end, Part I of this Article defines the problem: the new
breed of trademark infringement claims facing those who do business on
the Internet. Part II explores the possibility of, and potential impedi-
ments to, coverage for such claims under the traditional Commercial
General Liability (CGL) policy owned by most businesses. Part III an-
swers the question, "What if my CGL policy doesn't apply?" by introduc-
ing a representative sampling of new insurance products designed to fill-
at least in part-potential gaps in traditional coverage for high-tech
trademark infringement claims.
I. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT RISKS IN CYBERSPACE
A. INTRODUCTION
1. Trademark Infringement Generally
Section 43 of the Lanham Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125, is the
source of trademark infringement actions. The Lanham Act creates a pri-
vate cause of action against a person who: (1) uses any word, term, name,
symbol, or device; (2) which is likely to cause confusion as to the affilia-
tion of such person or that person's goods with another person or the
other person's goods.'
2. The Internet
The Internet is an international "super network" connecting millions of
computer networks and individual computers. The Internet is not a sin-
gle entity. It is a highly diffuse and complex system. For commercial
users, the World Wide Web (the "Web") may be the most important part
1. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (Supp. V 1994).
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of the Internet. Unlike previous Internet-based communication formats,
the Web is easy to use for people inexperienced with computers. Infor-
mation on the Web can be presented on "pages" of graphics and text that
contain "links" to other pages either within the same set of data files
("web site") or within data files located on other computer networks.
B. TYPES OF TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT RISKS CREATED BY USE
OF THE INTERNET
The early Internet was largely a conduit for the exchange of informa-
tion. Today's Internet has become increasingly commercial. All commer-
cial settings pose a risk that people will try to profit from the ideas and
good will of others. This is evident in the explosion of intellectual prop-
erty infringement claims arising from the use of the Internet.
The focus of this Article is solely on the use of trademarks on the In-
ternet. The most common Internet-based trademark infringement ac-
tions involve the unauthorized use of trademarks in domain names, meta
tags, linking and keying.
1. Domain Names and Cybersquatting
Web sites, like other information resources on the Internet, are cur-
rently addressed using the Internet "domain name system." The "In-
ternet protocol" numbering system gives each individual computer or
network a unique numerical address on the Internet. The "Internet pro-
tocol number" (or "IP number") comprises four groups of digits sepa-
rated by periods, such as "192.215.247.50." For the convenience of users,
individual computers on the Internet may also have an alphanumeric
name ("domain name"). Specialized computers known as "domain name
servers" maintain tables linking domain names to IP numbers.
Domain names are arranged so that, reading from right to left, each
part of the name moves toward a more localized area of the Internet.
"Second level" domain names, the name just to the left of the ".com" or
other Top Level Domain ("TLD"), such as ".gov," ".org" or ".net," must
be exclusive.2 Therefore, although two companies can have non-exclu-
sive trademark rights in a word, only one company can have a second
level domain name that corresponds letter-for-letter to its trademark. 3
The exclusive nature of second level domain names has pitted trade-
mark owners against each other in a struggle to establish a commercial
presence on the Internet, and has set businesses against domain name
holders (known as "registrants") who seek to continue the traditional use
2. TLDs are created and governed by the Internet Corporation of Assigned Names
and Numbers (ICANN). ICANN's most recent expansion of TLDs includes .info and .biz.
On May 15, 2001, ICANN approved a company called Afilias to maintain the registry for
the .info TLD and a company called Neulevel to maintain the .biz registries.
3. This is a real problem for the owners of the 487 trademarks containing the word
Delta, because there can be only one www.Delta.com. Melinda S. Giftos, Reinventing A
Sensible View Of Trademark Law In The Information Age, J. INTELL. PROP. (Fall 2000).
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of the Internet as a non-commercial medium of communication. As a
result, trademark infringement actions involving domain names almost
exclusively involve second level domain names. In fact, some jurisdic-
tions have held that only the second level domain name is protected
under the Lanham Act. 4
The first time a federal court held that a domain name was protectable
under the Lanham Act was in the Central District of California 5 1996
decision, Comp Examiner Agency, Inc. v. Juris, Inc. That Court relied on
the Lanham Act's injunctive power to enjoin the use of the domain name
"juris.com" because it infringed on the Juris trademark. The Comp Ex-
aminer case and its progeny established that unauthorized use of a trade-
mark in a domain name creates exposure in a civil suit to liability under
the Lanham Act, 6 so long as a commercial use is made of the domain
name 7 and the domain name is not a constitutionally protected parody of
the trademark owner's business.8
Once the ability to trademark domain names was cemented by the
courts, trademark holders launched an offensive against the profitable
business of cybersquatting/cyberpiracy. 9 The pioneers of cybersquatting,
such as Dennis Toeppen, began this practice of registering a domain
name that the "squatter" knows to be the trademark of another for the
purpose of selling the domain name to the true trademark owner. For
4. See, e.g., Patmont Motor Werks, Inc. v. Gateway Marine Inc., No. C 96-2703, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20877, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 1997) (holding that words appearing
after the second level domain name are not protected by the Lanham Act, thus "goped" in
www.idiosync.com/goped was not protected).
5. No. 96-0213, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20259 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 1996). In this case
the Comp Examiner used the domain name "juris.com" to sell software and services to
professionals in the legal, insurance, and forensic businesses. Juris Inc., the registrant and
prior user of the trademark JURIS for law office management software and related ser-
vices, sought to enjoin the Examiner from using the domain name "juris.com". The court
found that the Examiner's use of the domain name "juris.com" for selling software to
Juris's target market of lawyers and law firms was likely to cause confusion as to the source
of the Examiner's goods and services, thus infringing on Juris's trademark rights.
6. See, e.g., Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 580 (N.D. Cal.
1999) (denying motion to dismiss filed by company that had registered Seescandy.com as a
domain name); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (plannedparenthood.com), aff'd, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998); Play-
boy Enters., Inc. v. Imagenet, Inc., 95 Civ. 9589 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 8, 1995)
(playmates.com).
7. Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 879-80 (9th Cir. 1999) (registra-
tion of avery.net and dennison.net as vanity domain names was not commercial use and did
not cause dilution).
8. See, e.g., Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1167
(C.D. Cal. 1998) (ballysucks.com was protected speech and not commercial use). Use of
the actual name of the trademark owner's business, however, can still be infringement
despite the intent to parody the trademark. See Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp.
282, 308 (D.N.J. 1998) (jewsforjesus.org).
9. A variation of cybersquatting has been dubbed typosquatting, which is the regis-
tration of a domain name that is a misspelling of a trademark. Few lawsuits have been
filed against typosquatters, but courts have indicated that this would constitute an infringe-
ment. See, e.g., PaineWebber, Inc. v. Fortuny, No. 99-0456-A, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6552
(E.D. Va. Apr. 9, 1999) (holding registration of www.wwwpainewebber.com violated the
statute, even though Paine Webber had already registered www.painewebber.com, and
stripping the defendant of the domain name).
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instance, Toeppen registered the domain panavision.com, knowing that
such a domain belonged to Panavision International.10 The motive be-
hind cybersquatting is to extort payment from the trademark owner in
exchange for release of the domain name."
While the Lanham Act, in its original form, effectively dealt with cyber-
squatters, it did not treat them differently than an innocent infringer who
stumbled onto a domain name containing a trademark. In order to up
the ante on cybersquatting, Congress tacked the Anticybersquatting Con-
sumer Protection Act (ACPA) onto the Lanham Act. Pub. L. No. 106-
113, 113 Stat. 150 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1116-17, 1125(d),
1127, 1129).12
10. Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
11. Dennis Toeppen is commonly thought of as the original cybersquatter, and several
of the most cited cybersquatter cases bear his name. See e.g., id. (Toeppen enjoined from
using panavision.com and panaflex.com); Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227,
1241 (N.D. I11. 1996) (Toeppen enjoined from using intermatic.com); American Standard,
Inc. v. Toeppen, No. 96-2147 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14451, at *1, 2 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 1996)
(Toeppen enjoined from using americandstandard.com). Toeppen was also the registered
owner of several other trademark-containing domain names including: aircanada.com;
anaheimstadium.com; arriflex.com; australiaopen.com; camdenyards.com; deltaair-
lines.com; eddiebauer.com; flydelta.com; frenchopen.com; lufthansa.com; neiman-mar-
cus.com; northwestairlines.com; and yankeestadium.com. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v.
Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 619 (C.D. Cal. 1996). Many other cases involve other cyber-
squatters. See, e.g., McGraw v. Salmon, No. 98-2495R, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10987 (C.D.
Cal. June 30,1998) (country singers sought and obtained injunctive relief from cybersquat-
ter that registered their names).
12. (d) Cyberpiracy prevention.
(1) (A) A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark,
including a personal name which is protected as a mark under this section, if,
without regard to the goods or services of the parties, that person-
(i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, including a personal name
which is protected as a mark under this section; and
(ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that-
(I) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of registration of the
domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to that mark;
(II) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the time of registration of
the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to or dilutive of that
mark; or
(III) is a trademark, word, or name protected by reason of section 706 of
title 18, United States Code, or section 220506 of title 36, United States
Code.
(B) (i) In determining whether a person has a bad faith intent described
under subparagraph (A), a court may consider factors such as, but not lim-
ited to-
(I) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the person, if any,
in the domain name;
(II) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal name of the
person or a name that is otherwise commonly used to identify that person;
(III) the person's prior use, if any, of the domain name in connection with
the bona fide offering of any goods or services;
(IV) the person's bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a site
accessible under the domain name;
(V) the person's intent to divert consumers from the mark owner's online
location to a site accessible under the domain name that could harm the
goodwill represented by the mark, either for commercial gain or with the
intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of confusion
as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the site;
2001] 1977
SMU LAW REVIEW
The ACPA created a cause of action specifically directed toward cyber-
sqautters by adding a bad faith intent to profit element to typical in-
fringement claims. 13
Obviously, cybersquatting liability is not a risk that concerns most com-
panies, but the use of domain names is a definite risk for anyone that uses
the Internet. Every time a company registers a domain name and starts
up a web-site using that domain name, it faces the possibility of an in-
fringement action.
2. Meta Tags
A meta tag is a non-displaying (hidden) HTML 14 tag that provides
web-site owners with some degree of control over how their web pages
are indexed by search engines. Properly formatted and well composed
meta tags can increase the relevancy of retrieved web pages when
searches are performed at a number of very popular search engines.' 5
Because meta tags are not visible when viewing a web site, a web de-
signer is able to use trademarks in the meta tags to draw people to that
web site who are actually interested in viewing the trademark owner's
web site. For instance, a person searching for the Coca Cola web site
might enter "Coke" into a search engine. If PepsiCo's web designer has
placed "Coke" in its meta tags, then PepsiCo's web site would appear in
the search results. This can cause confusion to the consumer regarding
the affiliation and/or ownership of the PepsiCo web site.
(VI) the person's offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain name
to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain without having used,
or having an intent to use, the domain name in the bona fide offering of any
goods or services, or the person's prior conduct indicating a pattern of such
conduct;
(VII) the person's provision of material and misleading false contact infor-
mation when applying for the registration of the domain name, the person's
intentional failure to maintain accurate contact information, or the person's
prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct;
(VIII) the person's registration or acquisition of multiple domain names
which the person knows are identical or confusingly similar to marks of
others that are distinctive at the time of registration of such domain names,
or dilutive of famous marks of others that are famous at the time of registra-
tion of such domain names, without regard to the goods or services of the
parties; and
(IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the person's domain
name registration is or is not distinctive and famous within the meaning of
subsection (c)(1) of section 43 [subsec. (c)(1) of this section].
(ii) Bad faith intent described under subparagraph (A) shall not be found in
any case in which the court determines that the person believed and had
reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the domain name was a fair use
or otherwise lawful.
13. See id.
14. HTML is an acronym for Hypertext Markup Language, which is the computer
language used to program web-sites.
15. Search engines that index meta tag information include: AltaVista, HotBot, In-
foseek and Webcrawler. Other search engines, such as Yahoo, use the actual text of the
web-site or information submitted to the search engine when the web site owner registers
with the search engine.
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The confusion as to affiliation or ownership is the touchstone of trade-
mark infringement. Due to the confusion created by the search engine
results, courts consistently view the use of a trademark in meta tags as
infringement.16 The test is not whether the person is confused when
viewing the web-site. Rather, the trademark infringement occurs where
the Internet user is initially confused as to the association of the web-site
with the business of the trademark owner. 17 This is sometimes referred
to as "foot in the door" confusion.
3. Keying
Another service provided by most search engines is called keying. This
permits a web-site owner to pay a fee for its banner advertisement 18 to
appear when certain search terms are entered into the computer. For
instance, if "books" is entered as a search term in the Yahoo search en-
gine, the www.barnesandnoble.com banner advertisement appears at the
top of the page. As with meta tags, infringers can capitalize on their com-
petitors' good will by paying for their banner ad to appear when a search
term containing their competitors' trademarks is entered. Again confu-
sion arises because of the apparent affiliation between the trademark
term entered and the banner advertisement that appears. Courts have
consistently held that this type of initial confusion constitutes
infringement. 19
4. Web-site Content
A more traditional type of infringement occurs when a web-site owner
16. See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. AsiaFocus Int'l, Inc., No. 97-734-A, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10359, at *18-20 (E.D. Va. Feb. 2, 1998) (holding use of Playboy as a meta tag
for web site was infringement); see also Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, 985
F. Supp. 1220, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (same); Niton Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring De-
vices, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D.Mass. 1998) (in addition to infringement, use of refer-
ences to competitor in meta tags to lure customers to web site constitutes deceptive and
harmful trade practices).
17. Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062
(9th Cir. 1999) (enjoining use of domain name due to "initial interest confusion" caused by
use of competitor's marks in meta tags because that initial interest allowed the infringer to
profit from its competitor's good will); see also N.V.E. Pharm., Inc. v. Hoffman-La Roche,
Inc., No. 99-5858, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20204 (D.N.J. Dec. 27, 1999) (holding use of
"Stacker 2" (a weight loss drug) as meta tag to draw consumers to web-site for competitor
Xenical was infringement).
18. A banner advertisement is an advertisement that appears at another's web-site
that resembles a billboard, A person can click on the banner and be immediately trans-
ported to the advertiser's web-site.
19. See, e.g., Estee Lauder, Inc. v. The Fragrance Counter, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 269 (RS)
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (lawsuit against Excite for selling keywords relating to Estee Lauder). But
see, Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55. F. Supp. 2d 1070,1073-74
(C.D. Cal. 1999), affd, 202 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding no infringement where Net-
scape sold keying term "Playboy" to pornographic web-sites). See also Playboy Enters. v.
Excite, (C.D. Cal. filed Feb. 1999) (unresolved, but Playboy sued because Excite displayed
other companies' banner ads above search results when users enter Playboy's trademarks).
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places a trade- or service-mark in the content of the web-site. 20 While
many examples exist, nothing about these lawsuits is unique to the
Internet.
5. Registrar Liability
More than one hundred registrars have domain names in the ".com,"
".org," and ".net" TLDs on the Internet. A domain name registrar is a
company that acts as a registry for the domain names people want to use
for their web-sites. The premier registrar is NSI which acts as the princi-
pal registrar for .com, .net, .gov, .org, .edu, and .ws. 21 Because of its
prominence, NSI will be discussed here exclusively for describing the
types of infringement liability encountered by registrars.
NSI, like other registrars, maintains the authoritative database of In-
ternet registrations in TLDs. 22 By direction of the U.S. Department of
Commerce, NSI is required to provide registry data to the public.
NSI now receives its authority to act as a domain name registrar and
registry from ICANN and the Department of Commerce, and its conduct
and policies are governed by detailed, sometimes three-way contracts.2 3
Pursuant to those contracts and policies, NSI accepts registrations of
more than 100,000 Internet domain names per month and has accepted
more than twelve million domain name registrations to date.24
Registrars perform two functions in the domain name system. First,
they screen domain name applications against a registry database of ex-
isting second level domain names to prevent duplicate registrations of the
same name.2 5 Second, they maintain a directory linking domain names
with the IP numbers of domain name servers. 26 As a registry, NSI must
accept and list whatever domain name registrations are accepted by all
ICANN-accredited domain name registrars.
Registrars do not make independent determinations of an applicant's
right to use a domain name. Nor do they "assign" domain names; users
may create and choose any available second level domain name.2 7 More
than ninety percent of the electronic registrations for domain names are
processed completely electronically. 28 Most registrars do not consult with
third parties during the registration process to determine if the registrant
20. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Universal Tel-A-Talk, Inc., No. 96-6961, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17282, at *21 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 1998) (held using Playboy trademarks to advertise
adult photos in web-site constituted infringement).
21. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 982 (9th Cir.
1999).
22. Department of Commerce Information.
23. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., Civil Action No. 400-CV-0405-
A (N.D. Tex. 2001) (Defendant's brief in response to Motion for Summary Judgment).
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id.; see also Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp.
949, 953 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
27. Lockheed, 985 F. Supp. at 953.
28. Lockheed, 194 F.3d at 982.
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is attempting to register a domain name that happens to be the trademark
of another.29 Despite the rather passive involvement of registrars in do-
main name registration and ownership, registrars are frequently dragged
into trademark infringement suits for their alleged participation in the
infringement.30 Prior to the enactment of the ACPA, the question of
whether or not a registrar was liable for permitting the registration of an
infringing domain name was left open.31 The passing of the ACPA seem-
ingly disposed of the issue by stating that passive registrars could not be
held liable for infringement. 32
C. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT REMEDIES
The Lanham Act provides a variety of remedies to trademark owners
prosecuting infringement lawsuits.33 In all infringement cases, the trade-
mark owner may seek injunctive relief against the infringer.34 In cases
where the infringer has used the trademark commercially or where the
infringement is willful, the trademark owner can also recover monetary
damages, including profits, and costs. 35 In domain name disputes under
the ACPA, the trademark owner is limited to injunctive relief, except in
instances where the infringer acted in bad faith, in which case monetary
damages are available. 36 The ACPA also provides very specific injunctive
relief including the forfeit of the domain name and all related materials.
29. See id.
30. See, e.g., Panavision Int'l L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998); Lockheed
Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999).
31. Compare Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1316 (Ninth Circuit did not reach the issue, but
suggested that liability for NSI was possible) with Lockheed, 194 F.3d at 984 (holding NSI
not liable for infringement and likening NSI to a post office, which routes mail but does
not supply the address).
32. ACPA, § 10(d)(2)(D)(ii) ("The domain name registrar or registry or other domain
name authority shall not be liable for injunctive or monetary relief under this paragraph
except in the case of bad faith or reckless disregard, which includes a willful failure to
comply with any such court order."); see Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions,
Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 648, 654 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (granting summary judgment in favor of
NSI for alleged infringement as registrar because no showing of bad faith as required by
ACPA).
33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114-23.
34. Id.
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1117.
36. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1116-17, 1125(d), 1127, 1129:
(c) Remedies for dilution of famous marks. (1) The owner of a famous mark
shall be entitled, subject to the principles of equity and upon such terms as
the court deems reasonable, to an injunction against another person's com-
mercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the
mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the
mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided in this subsection .... (2)
In an action brought under this subsection, the owner of the famous mark
shall be entitled only to injunctive relief as set forth in section 34 [15 USC
§1116] unless the person against whom the injunction is sought willfully in-
tended to trade on the owner's reputation or to cause dilution of the famous
mark. If such willful intent is proven, the owner of the famous mark shall also
be entitled to the remedies set forth in sections 35(a) and 36 [15 USC




In addition, the ACPA provides an automatic remedy whereby a registrar
upon notice of an infringement suit must constructively deposit the do-
main name into the registry of the court. 37 Some form of injunctive relief
is the most common remedy awarded in domain name cases.38
D. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT FORUMS
The most common forum for trademark infringement disputes, until
recently, was federal court. Now, however, an alternative dispute resolu-
tion forum has been created by ICANN in conjunction with certain regis-
trars, called the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy ("UDRP"). The
UDRP requires all Registrars worldwide to follow the same dispute reso-
lution policy. The UDRP calls for a mandatory administrative proceed-
ing, using either the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) or
the National Arbitration Forum (NAF). NSI took the lead in instituting
the UDRP by creating a Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Pol-
icy that was approved by ICANN. This electronic form, which must be
signed by any registrant of a domain name with NSI, requires the regis-
trant to submit all disputes to one of the dispute resolution forums ap-
proved by the UDRP.39 Whether or not courts will enforce NSI's policy
is still questionable. 40
E. POLICING YOUR COMPANY'S TRADEMARK-INACTION CAN LEAD
TO LOSING PROTECTION
This Article's primary focus is on the defense of trademark infringe-
ment claims. However, trademark owners must keep in mind that turn-
ing a blind eye to an infringer can result in losing the exclusive right to
that trademark. Some courts have refused to enjoin an infringing use of a
trademark on the Internet where the trademark owner has knowingly al-
37. ACPA, § 10(d)(2)(D)(i):
"Upon receipt of written notification of a filed, stamped copy of a complaint
filed by the owner of a mark in a United States district court under this para-
graph, the domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain
name authority shall- (I) expeditiously deposit with the court documents
sufficient to establish the court's control and authority regarding the disposi-
tion of the registration and use of the domain name to the court; and (II) not
transfer, suspend, or otherwise modify the domain name during the pen-
dency of the action, except upon order of the court."
38. Panavision Int'l L.P. v. Dennis Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998) (issuing
injunction against Toeppen for use of panavision.com preventing him from making any use
of the domain name and ordering him to transfer registration of same to Panavision); Mc-
Graw v. Salmon, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10987 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 1998) (granting country
singers injunctive relief against cybersquatter that registered their names).
39. Additional provisions in NSI's policy include: (1) a requirement that NSI be ex-
cluded from any infringement disputes; and (2) a required representation that the name for
which the registration is being sought is not the trademark of another.
40. See Oppedahl & Larson v. Network Solutions, Inc., 3 F.Supp.2d 1147, 1161 (D.
Colo. 1998) (finding consent to arbitrate trademark dispute even though trademark was
registered before the dispute policy was created); Database Consultants, Inc. v. NSI (N.D.
Tex. 1997) (overriding NSI's dispute policy and ordering NSI to reconnect a domain name
that was placed on "hold" before the expiration of the 30-day grace period).
1982 [Vol. 54
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS
lowed the infringement to occur.41
The following sections of this Article assess the potential for insurance
coverages in defending and prosecuting the types of domain name dis-
putes and other Internet-related trademark infringement claims intro-
duced above. The next section demonstrates that the standard
Commercial General Liability (CGL) policy will likely cover the defense
of trademark infringement claims cases where an actual lawsuit is filed
and compensatory damages are sought. The standard CGL policy may
not, however, cover lawsuits seeking only injunctive relief (e.g., suits in-
volving innocent infringement) or in cases where the claimant files an
administrative claim under a UDRP rather than a lawsuit. Also, the stan-
dard CGL policy does not cover the costs of prosecuting a trademark
infringement claim. To fill some of the potential gaps in companies' in-
surance programs created by the limitations in the standard CGL, carriers
have begun offering new insurance products. The final section of this
Article surveys several non-CGL options available to businesses con-
cerned about insurance coverage for the growing number of domain
name and trademark disputes that their standard CGL may not cover.
These new products include coverages for the defense of administrative
proceedings, defense of lawsuits seeking only injunctive relief and even
coverage for the prosecution of infringement claims.
II. CGL COVERAGE FOR TRADEMARK
INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS
As demonstrated by Part I of this Article, the emergence and escalat-
ing popularity of the Internet have changed the landscape for trademark
owners seeking to protect their intellectual property, and have created
new opportunities for would-be infringers. New types of claims, new rem-
edies for infringement, and new forums for resolving disputes have en-
tered the scene. These changes should cause businesspeople accused of
trademark infringement to ask themselves two important questions. First,
if a trademark infringement claim is asserted against them, will they be
covered under their traditional liability insurance policies? Second, if
they are not covered under their traditional policies, what can they do?
Part II of this Article begins by analyzing coverage for trademark in-
fringement claims generally under the standard business liability policy-
the Commercial General Liability (CGL) policy. It then discusses poten-
tial "gaps" in the CGL's coverage implicated by the changing face of
trademark infringement claims arising from Internet usage. Part III of
this Article then describes new insurance products designed to fill some
of these potential gaps in a corporate policyholder's liability insurance
program.
41. See generally Virtual Works, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 845,
848 (E.D. Va. 2000).
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A. A POLICYHOLDER'S FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE: THE CGL POLICY
The primary weapon in the defensive arsenal of every corporate policy-
holder is the Commercial General Liability ("CGL") policy.42 While its
coverage is not boundless and is restricted by numerous exclusions, the
CGL policy nonetheless provides the broadest scope of liability coverage
of the basic business policies. For this reason, a policyholder faced with a
tort claim, including a claim for trademark infringement, should look first
to his CGL policy.
The original CGL policy was born out of confusion. Prior to 1940, each
carrier drafted its own version of general liability policy. The resulting
proliferation of widely different, often conflicting, policies led to difficulty
in their interpretation, and presented no "standard" provisions to be con-
strued and clarified over time by judicial precedent. Thus, in 1940, insur-
ance industry organizations developed a standard CGL form to be
adopted and issued by participating carriers. 43
Today, the industry organization responsible for issuing nearly all stan-
dard CGL forms is the Insurance Services Office, Inc. ("ISO").44
Founded in 1971, ISO provides a variety of services to more than 1,500
participating carriers and insurance agents.45 In addition to promulgating
standard form policies, ISO also provides its subscribers with "statistical,
actuarial, and underwriting information for and about the property/casu-
alty insurance industry. '46 ISO occasionally revises its standard CGL
form, potentially affecting coverage for various claims, including trade-
mark infringement. These revisions typically (though, perhaps, coinciden-
tally) occur just when policyholders believe they have mastered the
previous form. The most significant revisions to the ISO CGL form, for
purposes of the present analysis, occurred in 1986 and 1998.
42. Originally, this policy was titled Comprehensive General Liability. While retaining
the acronym "CGL," ISO changed its meaning to Commercial General Liability in 1986,
believing "that the term 'comprehensive' might constitute an invitation to courts to expand
coverage beyond what insurers intended." See Bailer v. Erie Ins. Exch., 687 A.2d 1375,
1384 n.5 (Md. 1997) (quoting Terri D. Keville, Note, Advertising Injury Coverage: An Over-
view, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 919, 919 n.1 (1992)).
43. See Laurie Vasichek, Note, Liability Coverage for "Damages Because of Property
Damage" Under the Comprehensive General Liability Policy, 68 MINN. L. REV. 795, 798
(1984) ("[The CGL] and other standardized liability policies were first developed in 1940
in response to confusion resulting from the previous practice of each insurer drafting its
own policy provisions. These standardized provisions have developed into virtual 'boiler-
plate' clauses for most liability insurance forms").
44. See Wisconsin Label Corp. v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 607 N.W.2d 276,
283 n.3 (Wis. 2000).
45. See www.iso.com/docs/about.htm; see also New Castle County v. Hartford Acci-
dent & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1181 (3d Cir. 1991) ("The ISO is a trade association that
provides rating, statistical, actuarial and policy drafting services to ... insurers .... Policy
forms developed by ISO are approved by its constituent insurance carriers and then sub-




B. How THE CGL POLICY WORKS
In its present incarnation, the CGL policy provides two basic-and
quite different-types of coverage, somewhat unhelpfully styled "Cover-
age A" and "Coverage B."'47 Coverage A provides coverage for "bodily
injury" and "property damage," as those terms are defined in the policy.
The primary limitation on Coverage A is that the "bodily injury" or
"property damage" at issue must have been caused by an "occurrence"-
a term also specifically defined in the policy. The standard definition of
"occurrence" is "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure
to substantially the same general harmful conditions." Thus, coverage is
typically not provided for "bodily injury" or "property damage" that was
not caused by an accident.
In contrast, Coverage B provides coverage for "personal injury" and
"advertising injury." Unlike Coverage A, which broadly provides cover-
age for various types of "bodily injury" and "property damage," Cover-
age B provides coverage only for a specific list of enumerated offenses.
As discussed more fully below, the list changes as ISO revises its form
over the years to address new types of torts not contemplated at the time
previous versions were drafted, and to clarify terms that have proven am-
biguous or difficult to interpret. Also unlike Coverage A, Coverage B is
not triggered by an "occurrence" (i.e., accident). Rather, it is triggered by
one of the listed "offenses," several of which are intentional torts. 48
The coverage provided by the CGL policy is limited. Obviously, a poli-
cyholder may face a variety of claims that do not fall within either Cover-
age A or Coverage B, or that are barred by an exclusion. A policyholder
may purchase an "umbrella" policy to fill in some of the gaps left by the
standard CGL policy.
In addition to providing two basic types of coverage, the standard CGL
policy generally imposes two basic duties on a carrier responding to a
claim within coverage: the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify. The
duty to defend requires the carrier to provide a legal defense to a policy-
47. The 1973, 1986 and 1998 forms each distinguish between Coverage A and Cover-
age B. However, the 1973 form includes only "bodily injury" coverage within Coverage A,
and "property damage" coverage within Coverage B. The 1986 form includes both "bodily
injury" and "property damage" coverage within Coverage A, and contains both "personal
injury" and "advertising injury" coverage within Coverage B. The 1998 form retains "bod-
ily injury" and "property damage" coverage within Coverage A, but combines the Cover-
age B insuring agreements distinguished as "personal injury" and "advertising injury" in
the 1986 form into a single insuring agreement for "personal and advertising injury," ac-
companied by a single definition of that term. This section discusses the structure of the
1986 form, which is the form most frequently used today. Differences in the 1973 and 1998
forms are discussed elsewhere in this section of the Article.
48. The coverage for intentional torts provided by Coverage B is unusual, in that in-
surance is generally designed to cover accidental, fortuitous events. See North Bank v.
Cincinnati Ins. Cos., 125 F.3d 983, 988 (6th Cir. 1997) ("It is implied in every insurance
contract that the insured event is a fortuitous one") (quoting EDWIN W. PATrERSON, Es-
SENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW § 58 (1957)). Both insurers and courts have raised concerns
about providing coverage for intentional acts because of the "moral hazard problem"-i.e.,
that a person who knows he has insurance coverage is more likely to commit a covered act
than one who is not covered.
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holder faced with a covered claim. Significantly, the duty to defend is
determined (in most jurisdictions) by simply comparing the plaintiff's
pleadings with the policy, regardless of the actual facts. If the plaintiff
alleges a claim that is arguably within coverage-even if that claim is
false, frivolous or even fraudulent-the carrier must provide a defense.
The duty to indemnify requires the carrier to pay a judgment entered
against the insured or, with certain restrictions, to fund a settlement. Un-
like the duty to defend, the duty to indemnify is not determined by the
plaintiff's pleadings, but by the actual facts as they are revealed through
litigation.
Another important aspect of the standard CGL policy is that it is an
"occurrence-based" policy. Policies with liability components, including
the CGL, typically contain one of two very different "coverage trig-
gers."'49 "Occurrence-based" policies are triggered when a covered event
(i.e., an "occurrence" under Coverage A or an "offense" under Coverage
B) takes place during the policy period, even if the resulting claim is as-
serted after the policy period ends. In contrast, "claims-made" policies
are triggered when a claim is asserted during the policy period, even if the
event giving rise to the claim occurred before the policy period began.50
The practical result of this distinction for an "occurrence-based" CGL
policyholder is that a claim may implicate either his current policy, a pre-
vious policy, or even several different policies, depending on when the
covered event(s) occurred.
C. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT AND THE CHANGING FACE OF THE
CGL's "ADVERTISING INJURY" COVERAGE
Not even the most creative lawyers have successfully argued that gar-
den-variety trademark infringement is covered as "bodily injury" or
"property damage" under Coverage A of the CGL policy. Nor is it argua-
bly covered under the "personal injury" component of Coverage B. Thus,
the battle over CGL coverage for trademark infringement is waged en-
tirely under the "advertising injury" component of Coverage B. As dis-
cussed below, the ISO form's "advertising injury" section has been
revised over time, and the revisions have affected courts' analyses of cov-
erage for trademark infringement.
49. Boardman Petroleum, Inc. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 926 F. Supp. 1566, 1570 n.4(S.D. Ga. 1995); Ameriwood Indus. Int'l Corp. v. American Cas. Co., 840 F. Supp. 1143,
1148 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
50. "Claims-made" policies generally do not provide retroactive coverage for prior
events that occurred in the distant past. Rather, they are limited by a "retroactive date,"
after which an event must have occurred to trigger the policy. A policy's retroactive date is
typically coordinated with the insured's previous program, to prevent a gap in coverage.
See Boardman Petroleum, Inc. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 926 F. Supp. 1566, 1570 n.4 (S.D.




1. The Three-Pronged "Advertising Injury Test"
To obtain coverage under the "advertising injury" portion of the CGL
policy, an insured must demonstrate the existence of three elements: (1)
that a claim against him at least arguably constitutes one or more of the
enumerated offenses listed in the policy's definition of "advertising in-
jury"; (2) that the insured engaged in "advertising activity" (as defined in
the policy) during the policy period in which the alleged "advertising in-
jury" occurred; and (3) a causal nexus between the alleged injury and the
insured's advertising activity. 51 These elements-advertising injury, ad-
vertising activity, and a causal nexus between the two-constitute a three-
pronged "advertising injury test."152
Meeting the "nexus" prong of the "advertising injury test" has often
proven difficult for claimants seeking coverage for certain types of intel-
lectual property torts, such as patent infringement.53 However, courts and
commentators have generally held that the use of a trademark is inher-
ently an advertising activity.5 4 Thus, demonstrating a causal nexus be-
tween the alleged infringement and the insured's advertising activities-
while not automatic-does not usually present a major obstacle to cover-
age. For this reason, courts analyzing coverage for trademark infringe-
ment under the CGL policy's "advertising injury" component have
focused primarily on the first prong of the test-i.e., whether trademark
infringement constitutes one of the enumerated offenses comprising the
policy's definition of "advertising injury." Complicating this analysis, ISO
substantially changed the list of "advertising injury" offenses in 1986. Be-
cause both the pre-1986 and post-1986 forms are still in use, it is neces-
sary to analyze coverage for trademark infringement under both of them.
2. Coverage for Trademark Infringement Under the 1973 ISO CGL
Form (and the 1981 Broad Form Comprehensive Liability
Endorsement)
ISO frequently makes minor revisions to its CGL form, but rarely un-
51. See, e.g., Bay Elec. Supply, Inc. v. Travelers Lloyds Ins. Co., 61 F. Supp. 2d 611,615
(S.D. Tex. 1999); N.H. Ins. Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 847 F. Supp. 1452, 1455 (N.D.
Cal 1994).
52. See, e.g., Zurich Ins. Co. v. Sunclipse, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 842, 852 (N.D. Ill. 2000),
affd, Zurich Ins. Co. v. Amcor Sunclipse N. Am., 241 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2001); Bay Elec-
tric, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 615; Farmington Cas. Co. v. Cyberlogic Techs., Inc., 996 F. Supp. 695,
699 (E.D. Mich. 1998).
53. See, e.g., Iolab Corp. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 15 F.3d 1500, 1506 (9th Cir. 1994); Nat'l
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Siliconix, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 77, 79 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
54. See, e.g., Parameter Driven Software, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co., 25 F.3d
332, 337 (6th Cir. 1994); American Employers' Ins. Co. v. DeLorme Publ'g Co., Inc., 39 F.
Supp. 2d 64, 74 (D. Me. 1999); Lebas Fashion Imps. of USA, Inc. v. ITT Hartford Ins.
Group, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 36, 41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); see also DAViD A. GAUNTLE'rF, INSUR-
ANCE COVERAGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSETS § 12.02[A] (2001) ("Because the
purpose of a trademark is to disseminate information identifying a company or product to




dertakes a major, substantive overhaul.55 For present purposes, the most
significant revision to the CGL form was made in 1986. The standard ISO
form in existence before the 1986 revision was promulgated in 1973, and
is therefore referred to as the 1973 ISO CGL form. While the majority of
CGL policies in use today are based on the 1986 CGL ISO form, some
insurers still issue the 1973 CGL ISO form.56 Also, because CGL policies
have "occurrence-based" coverage triggers, a policyholder's previous
1973 ISO CGL form policy may be implicated by a claim, even if his
current policy is based on the 1986 form.
The 1973 ISO CGL form does not itself provide "advertising injury"
coverage. Rather, it only provides coverage for what, under the 1986
form, is designated as Coverage A-i.e., "bodily injury" and "property
damage. ' 57 To partially fill this void, policyholders were invited to
purchase a 1973 Personal Injury Liability Supplement at additional cost.58
However, that supplemental policy expressly excluded coverage for of-
fenses arising out of the policyholder's advertising, which would bar cov-
erage for trademark infringement claims under the vast majority of
circumstances. 59 Not until 1981 did ISO issue a Broad Form Comprehen-
sive General Liability Endorsement that could be purchased as a supple-
ment to the 1973 form, which expressly provided coverage for
"advertising injury."'60 That endorsement defines "advertising injury" as
follows:
"Advertising Injury" means injury arising out of an offense commit-
ted during the policy period occurring in the course of the named
insured's advertising activities, if such injury arises out of libel, slan-
der, defamation, violation of right of privacy, piracy, unfair competi-
tion, or infringement of copyright, title or slogan. 6'
Obviously, "trademark infringement" is not included in the list of enu-
merated offenses. However, two rules of insurance policy construction,
adopted in most (if not all) jurisdictions, come to the policyholder's aid at
this juncture. The first is that terms that are not defined in an insurance
policy are interpreted according to their plain, ordinary and customary
55. The CGL policy's resistance to major change appears to be driven by the actuary's
science-a complex calculus demonstrating that minor changes can yield major results.
This "butterfly effect"-to borrow a term from chaos theory-perhaps explains the CGL
policy's retention of seemingly arcane language, and its rather counter-intuitive inclusions
and exclusions.
56. PATRICK J. WIELINSKI, INSURANCE FOR DEFECTIVE CONSTRUCTION: BEYOND
BROAD FORM PROPERTY DAMAGE COVERAGE 255 (2000).
57. Creating further confusion, the 1973 ISO form identifies coverage for "bodily in-
jury" as Coverage A, and coverage for "property damage" as Coverage B.
58. See Terri D. Keville, Note, Advertising Injury Coverage: An Overview, 65 S. CAL.
L. REV. 919, 926 (1992).
59. See id.
60. Insurance Services Office, Inc., Form GL 04 04 (Ed. 5-81). While "advertising in-
jury" coverage was not available under the ISO CGL until the issuance of this 1981 broad
form endorsement, because that endorsement was issued in connection with the standard
1973 ISO CGL form (and in an attempt to avoid confusion), this Article refers to "adver-




meanings. 62 None of the terms included in the policy's list of "advertising
injury" offenses is defined in the policy. Thus, policyholders can argue
that trademark infringement is included within the plain and ordinary
meanings of one or more of the terms listed as covered offenses.
The second rule of policy construction is related to the first: any ambi-
guity in insurance policy language must be construed against the carrier
and in favor of the policyholder.63 These two rules work together. Thus, a
policyholder may obtain CGL coverage for trademark infringement in
either one of two ways. First, if trademark infringement unambiguously
falls within the plain and ordinary definition of any of the enumerated
offenses, coverage exists. And second, if any of the enumerated terms is
ambiguous regarding whether it does or does not encompass trademark
infringement, coverage exists.
Policyholders have argued that three of the enumerated offenses in the
1973 policy-piracy, 64 unfair competition, and infringement of... title or
slogan-encompass trademark infringement. Most courts have agreed
that claims of trademark infringement either fall within the scope of one
of these three terms, or that those terms are sufficiently ambiguous to
warrant coverage. 65
Of the three terms at issue, "unfair competition" has been the subject
of the most litigation. The source of the controversy is that the undefined
term "unfair competition" is arguably subject to two very different inter-
62. See, e.g., United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Fid. Title Ins. Co., 258 F.3d 714, 718 (8th Cir.
2001) (applying Minnesota law); Winter v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 199 F.3d 399, 408 (7th
Cir. 1999) (applying Illinois law); Anderson v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 172 F.3d 767, 769
(11th Cir. 1999) (applying Florida law); Nat'l State Bank v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 492 F.
Supp. 393, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (applying New York law); Ramsay v. Md. Am. Gen. Ins.
Co., 533 S.W.2d 344, 346 (Tex. 1976).
63. See, e.g., Hardy v. Hartford Ins. Co., 236 F.3d 287, 291 (5th Cir. 2001) (applying
Louisiana law); Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kellman, 197 F.3d 1178, 1183 (6th Cir. 1999)
(applying Michigan law); Compass Ins. Co. v. City of Littleton, 984 P.2d 606, 613 (Colo.
1999); AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 799 P.2d 1253, 1264 (Cal.
1990); S & S Tobacco and Candy Co. v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 617 A.2d 1388, 1391
(Conn. 1992); Balderama v. W. Cas. Life Ins. Co., 825 S.W.2d 432, 434 (Tex. 1991); Ma-
thews v. Ranger Ins. Co., 281 So.2d 345, 349 (Fla. 1973).
64. The term "piracy," once in relative disuse, enjoys renewed relevance in the bur-
geoning field of "cyber-torts"). See, e.g., Chandnani v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc.,
No. 00-7820-CIV, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8069 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2001) (addressing
"cyber-piracy" claim); Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 89 F. Supp. 2d
1154 (C.D. Cal.), affd, 246 F.3d 675 (9th Cir. 2000) (analyzing claim of "domain name
piracy").
65. See, e.g., Parameter Driven Software v. Mass. Bay Ins. Co., 25 F.3d 332 (6th Cir.
1994) (applying Michigan law) (concluding that trademark infringement falls within scope
of "unfair competition"); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Siliconix, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 77, 80
(N.D. Cal. 1989) (applying California law) (although analyzing claim of patent infringe-
ment, concluded that term "piracy" is ambiguous, and would encompass trademark in-
fringement within meaning of "advertising injury" coverage); J.S. Brundage Plumbing &
Roto-Rooter, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co., 818 F. Supp. 553, 559 (W.D.N.Y. 1994)
("Clearly, then, infringement of title can include trademark or tradename in fringement");
Union Ins. Co. v. Knife Co., 897 F. Supp. 1213, 1217 (W.D. Ark. 1995) ("This court also
concludes that an action for trademark infringement can be described as 'infringement of a
copyright, title or slogan' as those terms are used in the policy").
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pretations. 66 Insurers have argued that the term should be limited to its
narrow, common-law definition-i.e., synonymous with the tort of "pass-
ing off" one's products as those of another. 67 In contrast, policyholders
have argued that the term should be interpreted more expansively to in-
clude a variety of unfair business practices in addition to "passing off."
Judicial analysis of this issue has resulted in a split of authority, with some
courts adopting the insurers' preferred narrow definition of "unfair com-
petition," 68 and others adopting the policyholders' broader reading of
that term.69 Still other courts have ruled that the term is ambiguous, in
that both possible interpretations are reasonable, resulting in coverage.70
The resulting confusion led ISO to delete the term "unfair competition"
in its 1986 revision, as discussed more fully below.
While most instances of trademark infringement would arguably fall
within the definition of at least one of the three listed "advertising injury"
offenses discussed above, the inquiry does not end there. The 1981 Broad
Form Comprehensive General Liability Endorsement which added an
optional "advertising injury" rider to the 1973 ISO form also contains two
particularly relevant exclusions. First, the endorsement excludes "adver-
tising injury" coverage "to any insured in the business of advertising,
broadcasting, publishing or telecasting."'7 Thus, policyholders whose bus-
iness is advertising, broadcasting, etc., must purchase specialized coverage
rather than relying on their standard CGL policy.
Second, the 1981 endorsement contains the following exclusion: "This
insurance does not apply: ... to advertising injury arising out of ... in-
fringement of trademark, service mark or trade name, other than titles or
slogans, by use thereof on or in connection with goods, products or ser-
vices sold, offered for sale or advertised .... ",72
This unusual clause is, in essence, an exclusion coupled with an excep-
tion to the exclusion that restores coverage for much (though certainly
66. See Novell, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 983, 987 (10th Cir. 1998) ("Litigation
over policies incorporating this definition often focused on the meaning of the term 'unfair
competition,' which can either be defined narrowly to mean the tort of 'passing off,' i.e.,
endeavoring to substitute one's own goods or products in the markets for those of another,
or broadly to include 'a whole host of loosely defined, unethical business practices"')
(quoting Terri D. Keville, Note, Advertising Injury Coverage: An Overview, 65 S. CAL. L.
REv. 919, 928 (1992)).
67. See id.
68. See, e.g., Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Peoples Church, 985 F.2d 446, 449 (9th Cir.
1993); Westfield Ins. Co. v. TWT, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 492, 496 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
69. See, e.g., Henderson v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 488 S.E.2d 234, 238-39
(N.C. 1997).
70. See Rymal v. Woodcock, 896 F. Supp. 637, 638 (W.D. La. 1995); Am. States Ins.
Co. v. Canyon Creek, 786 F. Supp. 821, 827 (N.D. Cal. 1991). The split of authority regard-
ing the proper definition of "unfair competition" supports the conclusion that the term is
ambiguous, and should be construed in favor of coverage.
71. See Insurance Services Offices, Inc., Form GL 04 04 (Ed. 5-81), p. 2.
72. Insurance Services Offices, Inc., Form GL 04 04 (Ed. 5-81), p. 2 (emphasis added).
As discussed in Part II1.B of this Article, some carriers have added an exclusion that is
similar-though broader-to new CGL forms by endorsement.
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not all) of what the clause would otherwise exclude.73 The exclusionary
portion of the clause expressly carves "infringement of trademark" out of
the policy's coverage. However, the exception provides that the exclusion
does not apply to claims of trademark infringement when the trademarks
at issue are "titles or slogans."
This exception is important in two respects. First, it clarifies that the
policy is intended to cover certain types of trademark infringement
claims. That intent was not entirely clear from the policy's inclusion of the
terms "unfair competition" and "piracy" as discussed above, and the ex-
ception confirms that the term "infringement of ... title or slogan" was
clearly intended to cover claims of infringement of trademarks that are
"titles or slogans."
Second, inclusion of coverage for infringement of trademarks that are
"titles or slogans" is significant in that many trademarks likely fall within
the meaning of these broad terms.74 However, courts have recognized
that some trademarks are not "titles or slogans."'75
In view of the insuring agreement, the definitions of "advertising in-
jury" and its enumerated offenses, and the exclusion/exception discussed
above, it appears that the 1973 ISO CGL policy coupled with the 1981
endorsement does provide coverage for at least certain types of trade-
mark infringement claims. However, ISO substantially revised its form
CGL policy in 1986, raising additional issues for those seeking coverage
of trademark infringement claims.
3. Coverage for Trademark Infringement Under the 1986 ISO CGL
Form
The most sweeping changes to the ISO CGL policy form in recent
years were made in 1986.76 Included in these changes were a substantial
revision of the policy's "advertising injury" coverage. Because the vast
majority of CGL policies in current usage are based on the 1986 ISO
73. For an excellent analysis of this exclusion, see generally DAVID A. GAUNTLETr,
INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSETS § 3.06 (1999).
74. See id., § 3.06[BJ1 ("Thus, by its plain language, this exclusion does not apply to a
significant number of the referenced excluded infringement actions").
75. See A Touch of Class Imps., Ltd. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 901 F. Supp. 175, 176
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (ruling that phrase "A Touch of Class" was a trademark "slogan," but
noting that "[t]rademarks can consist of something 'other than a title or slogan,' as the
insurance policy suggests," including color, scent, design of a package, etc.); see also Hugo
Boss Fashions, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 608, 618-20 (2d Cir. 2001) (excluding coverage
for trademark infringement claim because term "Boss" was not a "slogan").
76. For a thorough comparison of the 1973 ISO CGL form and the 1986 ISO CGL
form, see generally I INTERNATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE, INC., COMMERCIAL
LIABILITY INSURANCE §§ IV.E.1 - IV.E.18 (1997); DONALD S. MALECKI & ARTHUR L.
FLITNER, COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY (4th ed. 1992). For an analysis of these
changes in the specific context of "advertising injury" coverage, see generally DAVID A.
GAUNTLE-r, INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSETS Ch. 13




form, policyholders should carefully consider the differences between the
1973 form and the 1986 form.
First, it should be noted that "advertising injury" coverage was incorpo-
rated into the body of the 1986 ISO CGL form, whereas it was merely
offered by an optional endorsement to the 1973 form. The 1986 form in-
cludes both "personal injury" and "advertising injury" within Coverage
B.
Second, the 1986 form significantly modifies the laundry list of enumer-
ated offenses that constitute the policy's definition of "advertising
injury":
1. "Advertising injury" means injury arising out of one or more of
the following offenses:
a. Oral or written publication of material that slanders or libels a
person or organization or disparages a person's or organiza-
tion's goods, products or services;
b. Oral or written publication of material that violates a person's
right of privacy;
c. Misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business;
or
d. Infringement of copyright, title or slogan.77
Conspicuously absent from this list are the two terms that proved
troublesome for courts construing the 1973 policy form, "unfair competi-
tion" and "piracy." The 1986 form retains the term "infringement of...
title or slogan" from the 1981 broad form endorsement, and courts have
generally followed the same analysis of that term under the 1986 policy.
However, the 1986 ISO CGL form adds an entirely new item to its list of
"advertising injury" offenses: "misappropriation of advertising ideas or
style of doing business." Courts have suggested that this new term was
substituted for the term "unfair competition," which led to extensive con-
fusion under the 1973 form. 78 As discussed below, whether this new pro-
vision encompasses claims of trademark infringement has been the
subject of significant litigation.
Third, the exclusion for "infringement of trademark" other than "titles
or slogans" contained in the 1981 endorsement is omitted from the 1986
ISO CGL form. Thus, it appears that the 1986 form is intended to provide
more extensive coverage for trademark infringement than its
predecessor. 79
Of the changes to the ISO CGL form in 1986, by far the most litigated
has been the extent of coverage provided by the new term, "misappropri-
77. Insurance Services Office, Inc., Form CG 00 01 11 85, p. 7 (emphasis added).
78. Dogloo, Inc. v. N. Ins. Co., 907 F. Supp. 1383, 1389 (C.D. Cal. 1995); Union Ins.
Co. v. Knife Co., 897 F. Supp. 1213, 1216-17 (W.D. Ark. 1995); Lebas Fashion Imps. of
USA, Inc. v. ITI Hartford Ins. Group, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 36, 46 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
79. See GAUNTLE-1r, supra note 73, § 13.03[F] ("Courts have suggested that the re-
moval of this exclusion provides evidence of coverage for trademark infringement under
the 1986 ISO") (citing Lebas Fashion Imports v. ITT Hartford Ins. Group, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d
26, 31 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Keville, supra note 73, at 950 ("The absence of the trademark
infringement exclusion, however, seems to broaden coverage under the 1986 CGL").
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ation of advertising ideas or style of doing business." Specifically, courts
have struggled to identify the proper scope of the term "misappropria-
tion." As one court has explained, "[s]ome courts define the term nar-
rowly and technically to track the common-law tort of misappropriation
while others define the term generally and in its lay sense to mean 'take
wrongfully.' "80
In the context of trademark infringement claims, this controversy was
instigated by two landmark cases that reached opposite conclusions. 81 In
Lebas Fashion Imports of USA, Inc. v. ITT Hartford Insurance Group
("Lebas"),82 the California Court of Appeals carefully analyzed the
changes to the CGL's "advertising injury" coverage effected by the 1986
revision. The court concluded that trademark infringement is covered as
"misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business," as
follows:
It appears to us, reading the policy as a layman would, that an objec-
tively reasonable purpose of the phrase "misappropriation" of either
an "advertising idea" or a "style of doing business" is an attempt to
restrict or more narrowly focus the broader coverage potentially en-
compassed by the general term, "unfair competition" which was uti-
lized in the earlier policy language. When read in light of the fact
that a trademark infringement could reasonably be considered as
one example of a misappropriation, and taking into account that a
trademark could reasonably be considered to be part of either an
advertising idea or a style of doing business, it would appear objec-
tively reasonable that "advertising injury" coverage could now ex-
tend to the infringement of a trademark. 83
Seven days after the Lebas opinion was issued, the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals issued an opinion in Advance Watch Co. v. Kemper National
Insurance Co. ("Advance Watch"). 84 After analyzing the development of
the CGL policy, principles of Michigan intellectual property law, and con-
flicting case authorities, the Sixth Circuit concluded that trademark in-
fringement was not covered, as follows:
[Tihis court concludes.., that "misappropriation of advertising ideas
or style of doing business" does not refer to a category or grouping
of actionable conduct which includes trademark or trade dress in-
fringement. "Misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing
business" does not necessarily refer only to the common-law tort of
misappropriation.., but, we conclude, it does refer to the unautho-
rized taking or use of interests other than those which are eligible for
protection under statutory or common-law trademark law... Recog-
80. Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Methods Research Corp., No. 99C 7484, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17748 (N.D. II1. Dec. 4, 2000).
81. Compare Lebas Fashion Imps. of USA, Inc. v. ITT Hartford Ins. Group, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that trademark infringement is covered) with
Advance Watch Co., Ltd. v. Kemper Nat'l Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 795 (6th Cir. 1996) (concluding
that trademark infringement is not covered).
82. 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
83. Id. at 46.
84. 99 F.3d 795 (6th Cir. 1996).
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nition of trademark and trade dress infringement as a distinct cate-
gory of actionable conduct is so common that the only reasonable
assumption is that if [the insurer] had intended to provide coverage
for such liability, the insurer would have referred to it by name in the
policy, as it did in the case of "infringement of copyright, title or
slogan."8 5
As if it anticipated the sharp criticism this unusual holding was des-
tined to generate, the court added, "[t]he reading which we give 'misap-
propriation of advertising ideas or of style of doing business' is not a
technical or strained one, and does not violate the injunction of Michigan
law to construe terms in insurance policies according to their commonly
understood meanings."'86 The court concluded that a broader interpreta-
tion of the term "would lead to the absurd result of providing coverage
for liability for trademark infringement without any mention of the word
'trademark.' 87
Of course, courts across the nation had found coverage for trademark
infringement claims despite the fact that the 1973 ISO CGL form did not
mention the word "trademark" in its definition of "advertising injury,"
and the conclusions of those courts, presumably, are not "absurd." At any
rate, the Advance Watch court's attempt to preempt criticism failed mis-
erably. Leading the charge in rebuttal was the Lebas court itself, which
revised its original opinion for the express purpose of debunking the Ad-
vance Watch holding.88 Additional criticism followed, most sharply from a
Michigan court voicing its displeasure with what it considered the Sixth
Circuit's gross misinterpretation of Michigan law:
The analysis and reasoning of the Sixth Circuit is not only unpersua-
sive and flawed, but demonstrates a lamentable lack of understand-
ing and grasp of the law of trademark/trade dress, and ultimately led
to an unduly narrow holding and somewhat bizarre and tortured ap-
plication of Michigan insurance law.89
At least one other jurisdiction has followed Advance Watch in holding
that the term "misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing bus-
iness" does not encompass trademark infringement.90 However, the vast
majority have concluded that trademark infringement falls within the
meaning of that term, and is therefore covered under the "advertising
injury" portion of the 1986 ISO CGL form.91 Although the Advance
85. Id. at 802-03.
86. Id. at 803.
87. Id.
88. See Lebas, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 47 n.14.
89. Am. States Ins. Co. v. Hayes Specialties, Inc., No. 97-020037, 1998 WL 1740968, at
*3 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1998).
90. See Callas Enters., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 193 F.3d 952, 956-57 (8th
Cir. 1999). Several other jurisdictions have followed the rationale of Advance Watch in the
context of other types of claims, such as patent infringement and copyright infringement.
However, an analysis of those opinions is beyond the scope of this Article.
91. See, e.g., Applied Bolting Tech. Prods., Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 942
F. Supp. 1029, 1034 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 118 F.3d 1574 (3d Cir. 1997); Cat Internet Sys. v.
Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 153 F. Supp. 2d 755, 762 (E.D. Pa. July 25, 2001); Flodine v.
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Watch opinion has become something of a favorite punching bag for poli-
cyholders and courts alike, it is still valid precedent in the Sixth Circuit (at
least applying Michigan law), as well as in the Eighth Circuit (applying
Minnesota law). In addition, carriers in jurisdictions that have not yet
addressed the issue of coverage for trademark infringement under the
1986 form will undoubtedly argue that Advance Watch should be fol-
lowed. Nonetheless, it appears that most jurisdictions either have, or
would, hold that trademark infringement falls within the definition of
"misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business" and/or
the term "infringement of ... title or slogan" carried forward from the
1973 ISO form.
However, as with the 1973 ISO CGL form, policyholders seeking cov-
erage for trademark infringement under the 1986 form must consider not
only the policy's insuring agreement and definition of "advertising in-
jury," but also potentially applicable exclusions. As noted above, the 1986
form omits the exclusion expressly referencing trademark infringement
contained in the 1981 Broad Form Comprehensive Liability Endorse-
ment. However, it does contain an exclusion for "an offense committed
by an insured whose business is advertising, broadcasting, publishing or
telecasting. '92 This exclusion, which is quite similar to an exclusion con-
tained in the 1973 ISO CGL form, requires a policyholder whose business
is advertising, etc., to look beyond its standard CGL policy for coverage.
State Farm Ins. Co., No. 99-C-7466, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2204, at *20-34 (N.D. I11. Feb.
27, 2001) (and authorities cited therein); Ecko Group, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., No. 99-
236-JD 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17702, at *17 (D.N.H. 2000); Bay Elec. Supply, Inc. v. Trav-
elers Lloyds Ins. Co., 61 F. Supp. 2d 611, 615-17 (S.D. Tex. 1999); Am. Employers' Ins., Co.
v. DeLorme Publ'g Co., 39 F. Supp. 2d 64, 75-76 (D. Me. 1999); Vivid Video, Inc. v. N. Am.
Specialty Ins. Co., No. CV98-8674 RSWL, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15322 (C.D. Cal. June 29,
1999); Essex Ins. Co. v. Redtail Prods., No. 3:97-CV-2120-D, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18507,
at *6 n.1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 1998), aff'd, 213 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 2000); Mass. Bay Ins. Co. v.
Penny Preville, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 4845, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9671 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 1996);
Dogloo, Inc. v. N. Ins. Co., 907 F. Supp. 1383, 1389-90 (C.D. Cal. 1995); Union Ins. Co. v.
Knife Co., Inc., 897 F. Supp. 1213, 1216-17 (W.D. Ark. 1995); Poof Toy Prods., Inc. v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 891 F. Supp. 1228, 1233 (E.D. Mich. 1995); Ben Berger
& Son, Inc. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., No. 94 Civ. 3250, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8976
(S.D.N.Y. June 29, 1995); Am. Econ. Ins. Co. v. Reboans, Inc., 900 F. Supp. 1246 (N.D.
Cal. 1995); Nortek, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 858 F. Supp. 1231, 1237 (D.R.I. 1993); P.J.
Noyes v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 855 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.H. 1994); St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. Advanced Interventional Sys., Inc., 824 F. Supp. 583, 585 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff'd,
21 F.3d 424 (4th Cir. 1994); J.A. Brundage Plumbing & Roto-Rooter, Inc. v. Massachusetts
Bay Ins. Co., 818 F. Supp. 553, 557-58 (W.D.N.Y. 1993), vacated, 153 F.R.D. 36 (W.D.N.Y.
1994); Sorbee Int'l Ltd. v. Chubb Custom Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 712, 716-17 (Pa. 1999); Ross v.
Briggs & Morgan, 520 N.W.2d 432 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); see GAUNTLE-r, supra note 73,
§ 13.01[A] ("Most courts that have analyzed trademark infringement under the 1986 Insur-
ance Service Office (ISO) policy have found it to be a covered offense").
92. Insurance Services Office, Inc., Form CG 00 01 11 85, p. 4.
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4. Coverage for Trademark Infringement Under the 1998 ISO CGL
Form
ISO again substantially revised its CGL form policy in 1998.93 The 1998
ISO CGL form is not yet in widespread use, and has not been the subject
of judicial interpretation. However, since the new form significantly mod-
ifies the policy's "advertising injury" coverage, it may affect future analy-
sis of CGL coverage for trademark infringement claims.
The 1998 ISO form combines the Coverage B components traditionally
distinguished as "personal injury" and "advertising injury" into a single
insuring agreement for "personal and advertising injury," accompanied
by a single definition of that term. The new form includes several signifi-
cant changes relevant to the present analysis. A leading commentary ex-
plains the basic significance of these changes:
The 1998 edition CGL attempted to remove some of the uncertainty
regarding the meanings of "advertising" and "in the course of adver-
tising" by eliminating both terms from the policy wording. In their
place, the 1998 version of coverage B ties only two of its "personal
and advertising injury" offenses specifically to advertising activities:
misappropriation of advertising ideas and copyright infringement....
Moreover, the newly redefined offenses must be committed not "in
the course of advertising" but rather in an "advertisement," a term
that is also defined in the policy. 94
The new term "advertisement" is defined as "a notice that is broadcast
or published to the general public or specific market segments about your
goods, products or services for the purpose of attracting customers or
supporters. '95 This definition of "advertisement" is intended to clarify, in
several respects, the intended scope of the undefined terms "advertising"
and "in the course of advertising" that proved problematic in the 1986
format. For example, courts have grappled with how widespread the dis-
tribution of information must be to constitute "advertising. '96 While the
1998 definition does not entirely resolve this question, it at least clarifies
that, to constitute an "advertisement," a policyholder's "notice" must be
distributed "to the general public or specific market segments." Distribu-
tion via the Internet should generally meet this requirement. The new
definition also provides some clarification regarding the purpose of a cov-
93. See I INTERNATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE, INC., COMMERCIAL LIABIL-
ITY INSURANCE § V.E.2 (2000) ("The most sweeping set of changes in the history of cover-
age B were introduced as part of the 1998 edition of the CGL form").
94. Id. § V.E.7.
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Fox Chem. Co., Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 264 N.W.2d 385, 386 (Minn.
1978) (holding "public or widespread distribution" required); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 769 F.2d 425, 429 (7th Cir. 1985) (following Fox Chemical in
concluding that letter sent to 11 people did not constitute advertising); John Deere Ins. Co.
v. Shamrock Indus., Inc., 696 F. Supp. 434, 439-40 (D. Minn. 1988), affd, 929 F.2d 413 (8th
Cir. 1.991) (expressly rejecting Fox Chemical and Playboy requirement of broad distribu-
tion and concluding that publication to even one person may constitute "advertising"); see
generally Keville, supra note 73, 936-46 (analyzing conflicting authorities and arguing for
retention of broad distribution requirement).
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ered "advertisement"-i.e., "attracting customers or supporters." A poli-
cyholder's "notice" may well fall within this newly clarified definition of
"advertisement."
Another significant change in the 1998 ISO CGL form is its definition
of the term "personal and advertising injury." This definition combines
the laundry lists of enumerated offenses distinguished as "personal in-
jury" and "advertising injury" under the 1986 form. It also changes the
wording of several enumerated offenses in ways that may affect coverage
for trademark infringement. The new definition of "personal and adver-
tising injury" provides as follows:
"Personal and advertising injury" means injury, including conse-
quential "bodily injury," arising out of one or more of the following
offenses:
a. False arrest, detention or imprisonment;
b. Malicious prosecution;
c. The wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into, or invasion of
the right of private occupancy of a room, dwelling or premises
that a person occupies, committed by or on behalf of its owner,
landlord or lessor;
d. Oral or written publication of material that slanders or libels a
person or organization or disparages a person's or organiza-
tion's goods, products or services;
e. Oral or written publication of material that violates a person's
right of privacy;
f. The use of another's advertising idea in your "advertisement"; or
g. Infringing upon another's copyright, trade dress or slogan in
your "advertisement".97
As evident from the above-quoted list, ISO replaced the 1986 term
"misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business" with
the new term "use of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement."'
The primary purpose of this change was undoubtedly to delete the con-
troversial term "misappropriation" that spawned extensive litigation in
the Lebas and Advance Watch lines of cases, discussed above. Substitu-
tion of the term "use" for "misappropriation" in the 1998 form also indi-
cates ISO's rejection of the Sixth Circuit's limitation of the term
"misappropriation" to something akin to the narrowly defined common-
law tort of misappropriation.
ISO also removed the broad term "style of doing business" from this
provision, limiting the definition to "use of another's advertising idea in
your advertisement." This change is significant, in that courts have con-
strued certain trademarks as encompassed within the term "style of doing
business."' 98 Based on case authorities construing the 1986 provision,
however, it does not appear that this change would affect coverage for a
majority of trademark infringement claims, which would still be covered
97. Insurance Services Offices, Inc., Form CG 00 01 07 98 (emphasis added).
98. See GAUNTLETr, supra note 73 § 13.03[D][3] (and authorities analyzed therein).
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as "use of another's advertising idea." 99
The 1998 ISO form also substitutes the term "[i]nfringing upon an-
other's copyright, trade dress or slogan in your 'advertisement"' for the
analogous 1986 term, "infringement of copyright, title or slogan." This
change is also significant, in that it would appear to limit the types of
trademark infringement claims that would fall within the meaning of this
enumerated offense. Specifically, courts analyzing the 1973 and 1986
forms have held that a trademark may be a "title."'1
Substitution of the new term "trade dress" for "title" may also impact
coverage for trademark infringement claims, in that trademark and trade
dress have traditionally been considered distinct concepts. 10 However,
the terms clearly overlap. In fact, in the landmark Two Pesos opinion, the
United States Supreme Court stated that there is no basis for distinguish-
ing between trademark and trade dress infringement claims under the
Lanham Act.102 Thus, a policyholder faced with a trademark infringe-
ment claim may actually be able to obtain coverage under the 1998 pol-
icy's "infringing upon another's ... trade dress" offense.
In addition, the 1998 ISO form contains a new exclusion potentially
relevant to certain trademark infringement claims, barring coverage for
"personal or advertising injury" that is "[c]aused by or at the direction of
the insured with the knowledge that the act would violate the rights of
another and would inflict 'personal and advertising injury."' 0 3 This ex-
clusion is broader than the analogous provision contained in the 1981 en-
dorsement and the 1986 form, which excluded coverage only for
"personal injury" or "advertising injury" "[a]rising out of the willful vio-
lation of a penal statute or ordinance committed by or with the consent of
the insured."' 1 4 It thus appears that the 1998 CGL form may be inter-
preted to exclude coverage for any intentional act of trademark infringe-
ment, regardless of whether that act violates a "penal statute or
ordinance." As many acts of trademark infringement are likely to be in-
tentional, this new exclusion may significantly limit coverage.
99. See, e.g., P.J. Noyes v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 855 F. Supp. 492, 495 (D.N.H. 1994);
J.A. Brundage Plumbing & Roto-Rooter, Inc. v. Mass. Bay Ins. Co., 818 F. Supp. 553, 557
(W.D.N.Y. 1993), vacated, 153 F.R.D. 36 (W.D.N.Y. 1994); Sorbee Int'l Ltd. v. Chubb
Custom Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 712, 716 (Pa. 1999).
100. See, e.g., J.A. Brundage Plumbing & Roto-Rooter, Inc. v. Mass. Bay Co., 818 F.
Supp. 553, 559 (W.D.N.Y. 1993); Merchants Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 794 F. Supp.
611, 619 (S.D. Miss. 1992).
101. See Univ. of Fla. v. KPB, Inc., 89 F.3d 773, 776 n.4 (11th Cir. 1996) (presenting
traditional definitions of "trademark" and "trade dress").
102. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 773 (1992); see Sunbeam Prods.,
Inc. v. West Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246, 251 & n.4 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1118
(1998) ("[B]ecause the Lanham Act 'provides no basis for distinguishing between trade-
mark and trade dress,' the test for trade dress protection is identical to that for trademark
protection").
103. Insurance Services Office, Inc., Form CG00010798.




In the balance, however, the changes in the 1998 ISO CGL form would
appear to broaden potential coverage at least for claims of unintentional
trademark infringement. Addition of "[tihe use of another's advertising
idea in your 'advertisement"' as a covered offense would appear to en-
compass a broad variety of trademark infringement claims. In addition, as
discussed above, a trademark infringement claim may fall within the
meaning of the term "infringing upon another's copyright, trade dress or
slogan in your 'advertisement."' The newly defined term "advertisement"
is broad enough to include numerous activities that may give rise to
trademark infringement claims.
Moreover, it appears that ISO intends for the CGL form to cover cer-
tain types of trademark infringement claims. ISO is well aware of the
extensive litigation regarding CGL coverage for trademark claims dis-
cussed in this Article. If it intended to exclude coverage for trademark
infringement, it could have easily added an exclusion to that effect in its
1998 revision. Its decision not to do so, as well as its deletion in 1986 of a
former exclusion expressly barring coverage for certain types of trade-
mark infringement claims, indicates that the ISO CGL form is intended
to cover claims of trademark infringement.
Despite these changes, the litigation continues. Even if a policyholder
ultimately prevails in demonstrating that the trademark claim against him
is covered by his standard CGL policy, coverage litigation can be tremen-
dously expensive. Moreover, the gray areas remaining in the 1986 ISO
form, currently the most common CGL policy, invite carriers to contest
coverage for trademark claims-particularly in jurisdictions that have not
yet addressed some of the thorny issues discussed in this Article.
D. CGL COVERAGE FOR INTERNET-RELATED TRADEMARK
INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS
The preceding analysis of traditional CGL coverage for trademark in-
fringement claims foreshadows potential problems for policyholders
faced with the emerging types of Internet-related claims discussed in Part
I of this Article. This section discusses the more significant threats to
CGL coverage posed by these new claims.
1. Does the Claim Seek "Damages"?
Most fundamentally, the question arises whether the Insuring Agree-
ment of Coverage "B" extends, on its face, to these new types of claims.
For example, the Insuring Agreement of the 1986 ISO form'0 5 provides
as follows:
We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to
pay as damages because of "personal injury" or "advertising injury"
to which this insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to
105. The 1986 Insuring Agreement is representative of the CGL form policies discussed
in this Article for purposes of the present analysis.
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defend any "suit" seeking those damages. We may at our discretion
investigate any "occurrence" or offense and settle any claim or "suit"
that may result.10 6
Several aspects of this insuring agreement are relevant to the present
analysis. First, it only extends to claims for "damages." As discussed in
Part I of this Article, the primary remedy available under the Lanham
Act is injunctive relief.10 7 The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act (ACPA) incorporated into the Lanham Act to address the specific
concerns presented by cybersquatting and related activities also provides
injunctive relief as its principal remedy.' 08 Obviously, claims regarding
the misuse of meta tags, linking or keying may also seek injunctive
remedies.
Suits seeking only injunctive relief have proven problematic to insureds
seeking liability coverage under their CGL policies, in that numerous
courts have held that such suits do not seek "damages" within the mean-
ing of the CGL insuring agreement.109 However, despite this general
principle, policyholders faced with trademark infringement claims should
not abandon hope for CGL coverage too hastily. Regarding Lanham Act
claims, while they may primarily seek injunctive relief, they can also in-
clude claims for damages.' 0 Many jurisdictions have held that a CGL
carrier must defend an entire suit if even one claim in the suit is cov-
ered.' Thus, a policyholder facing a trademark infringement suit seek-
ing both injunctive relief and monetary damages would be entitled to a
defense of the entire suit. 112 Moreover, several courts have determined
106. Insurance Services Office, Inc., Form CG 00 01 11 85 (emphasis added).
107. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) ("In an action brought under this subsection, the owner
of the famous mark shall be entitled only to injunctive relief.., unless the person against
whom the injunction is sought willfully intended to trade on the owner's reputation or to
cause dilution of the famous mark").
108. ACPA § 12.
109. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hanna, 224 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1955); Haynes v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 428 F. Supp. 435 (D. Md. 1977); Maryland Cup Corp. v.
Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 568 A.2d 1129 (Md. Ct. App. 1990); Feed Store, Inc. v.
Reliance Ins. Co., 774 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied); Gar-
den Sanctuary, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 292 So.2d 75 (Fla. Ct. App. 1974).
110. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 855 F.2d 779, 780-81 (11th Cir. 1988); ThelenOil Co. v. Fina Oil & Chem. Co., 962 F.2d 821, 822 (8th Cir. 1992). As noted in Part I of
this Article, however, monetary damages are only available in domain name disputes
where the infringement was in bad faith.
111. See, e.g., Lafarge Corp. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 61 F.3d 389, 393 (5th Cir.
1995)(applying Texas law); Morrow Corp. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 110 F.Supp.2d 441,
445 (E.D. Va. 2000)(applying Virginia law); Farmington Cas. Co. v. United Educators Ins.
Risk Retention Group, Inc., 117 F.Supp.2d 1022, 1029 (D. Colo. 1999)(applying Colorado
law); St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Texas Dep't of Transp., 999 S.W.2d 881, 883-84 (Tex. App.-Austin
1999, pet. denied); Irvine v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 630 So.2d 579, 579-80 (Fla.
Ct. App. 1993); Allstate Ins. v. Freeman, 443 N.W.2d 734 (Mich. 1989); First Ins. Co. of
Hawaii v. State, 665 P.2d 648 (Ha. 1983).
112. As a caveat, note that carriers have recently attempted to persuade courts that
they should be allowed to seek reimbursement from their insureds of defense costs in-
curred in connection with non-covered claims. The leading opinion on this issue is Buss v.
Superior Court, 939 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1997). While Buss provides that a carrier must state its
intent to seek reimbursement of defense costs in a reservation of rights letter in order to
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that certain types of injunctive relief may themselves constitute "dam-
ages" within the scope of CGL coverage, distinguishing between injunc-
tions that merely prohibit the continuation of improper activities and
those that require the enjoined party to incur monetary costs to comply
with the injunction. 113 Thus, even if a trademark infringement suit only
seeks "injunctive" relief, the defendant should consider the possibility of
CGL coverage.
2. Does the Claim Involve a "Suit"?
A second potential impediment to coverage for new types of trade-
mark infringement claims posed by the CGL insuring agreement is the
requirement of a "suit" to trigger the duty to defend. The 1973 ISO form
does not define the term "suit," and carriers will argue that nothing short
of a formal judicial proceeding constitutes a "suit" within the meaning of
that term. The 1986 and 1998 ISO forms define the term "suit" as follows:
"Suit" means a civil proceeding in which damages because of "bodily
injury," "property damage," "personal injury" or "advertising injury" to
which this insurance applies are alleged. "Suit" includes:
a. An arbitration proceeding in which such damages are claimed and
to which you must submit or do submit with our consent; or
b. Any other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in which such
damages are claimed and to which you submit with our
consent.114
As discussed in Part I.D. of this Article, mandatory alternative dispute
resolution ("ADR") is an emerging trend in the resolution of high-tech
trademark infringement claims. While the post-1986 CGL definition of
"suit" does encompass certain types of arbitrations and, with the carrier's
consent, other types of ADR proceedings, carriers may argue that the
definition of "suit" does not extend to the emerging types of non-judicial
proceedings in which trademark infringement claims are resolved. More-
over, those carriers that still issue the 1973 ISO form will argue that only
a formal civil lawsuit constitutes a covered "suit."
Carriers support these arguments by noting that the insuring agree-
ment itself distinguishes between a "claim" and a "suit," indicating that
the term "suit" does not encompass a mere "claim" for damages asserted
outside the courtroom.1 5 Unfortunately for policyholders, courts in vari-
ous jurisdictions have reached different, conflicting resolutions of this is-
recoup them from the insured, the opinion has encouraged carriers across the nation to
seek reimbursement. This issue remains unresolved in a majority of jurisdictions.
113. See, e.g., In re Texas E. Transmission Corp., 870 F. Supp. 1293, 1332 (E.D. Pa.
1992), affd without op., 995 F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1993), affd, 15 F.3d 1230 (3d Cir. 1994); AIU
Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.3d 807, 841-42 (Cal. 1990).
114. Insurance Services Office, Inc., Form CG 00 01 10 93.
115. See, e.g., Foster-Gardner, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 959




sue. 116 In view of these conflicting authorities, policyholders should be
aware that their carriers may balk at providing a defense for a trademark
infringement claim that does not involve a formal lawsuit-or, for carri-
ers issuing the 1986 or 1998 ISO form-at least mandatory arbitration.
3. Does the Claim Seek Punitive Damages?
A third potential impediment to CGL coverage posed by emerging
types of Internet-related trademark infringement claims involves cover-
age for punitive damages. As discussed in Part I of this Article, the Lan-
ham Act imposes monetary damages on a defendant who infringes on
another's domain name in bad faith. Moreover, the ACPA with which the
Lanham Act was recently supplemented adds a "bad faith intent to
profit" element to a traditional infringement claim. To the extent that
resulting damages are construed as punitive damages for intentional mis-
conduct, CGL coverage for those damages may be restricted.
As noted above, the CGL form has evolved over time, evidencing a
trend toward excluding coverage for claims of intentional trademark in-
fringement. Moreover, many carriers incorporate express exclusions for
punitive or exemplary damages into their CGL policies. And even in
cases where the policy itself is silent regarding coverage for punitive dam-
ages, some jurisdictions prohibit coverage for punitive damages as a mat-
ter of public policy. 117 Some jurisdictions have carved an exception out of
this general prohibition in cases where punitive damages are assessed
solely for vicarious liability resulting from the misconduct of another. 118
Still other jurisdictions, including Texas, have not ruled that insurance
coverage for punitive damages violates public policy.119 Although not all
jurisdictions have reached this issue, policyholders faced with high-tech
trademark infringement claims should be aware that their CGL policies
may limit coverage for punitive damages.
116. See Foster-Gardner, 959 P.2d at 272-279 (comparing authorities adopting a "literal
meaning" approach, i.e., requiring a formal lawsuit; a "functional" approach, i.e., requiring
the "functional equivalency" of a judicial proceeding; and a "hybrid" approach, i.e., requir-
ing a demand that has progressed beyond a mere, informal request for voluntary action but
still falls short of a formal lawsuit). While the Foster-Gardner decision specifically involved
CGL coverage for environmental cleanup actions, it provides a thorough analysis of how
courts have addressed the meaning of the term "suit" generally.
117. See, e.g., Derechin v. State Univ. of N.Y., 963 F.2d 513, 519 (2d Cir. 1992)(applying
New York law)(noting that, as of the date of the opinion, "[e]ighteen states have held that
insurance policies covering punitive damages assessed directly on the defendant are void as
a matter of public policy"). Among the states prohibiting coverage for punitive damages
are California and New York.
118. See, e.g., Dayton Hudson Corp. v. Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 621 P.2d 1155, 1156
(Okla. 1980).
119. Compare Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Safway Steel Prods. Co., 743 S.W.2d 698 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1987, writ denied) (concluding, along with three other opinions applying
Texas law, that public policy does not prohibit coverage for punitive damages) with Hart-
ford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Powell, 19 F. Supp. 2d 678 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (analyzing Texas prece-




4. Were Damages Caused Within the "Coverage Territory"?
Another aspect of the CGL policy relevant to Internet-related trade-
mark infringement claims is the "Coverage Territory" to which the policy
applies. The 1986 and 1998 ISO forms define "Coverage Territory," in
relevant part, as "The United States of America (including its territories
and possessions), Puerto Rico and Canada .... "120 Many carriers are
willing to negotiate a broader "coverage territory" (e.g., "anywhere in the
world") for corporate policyholders with international business opera-
tions. But Internet usage exposes all businesses to a risk of international
infringement claims. Because coverage for such claims might be excluded
by the standard CGL definition of "Coverage Territory," policyholders
facing international exposure should consider obtaining a worldwide en-
dorsement. They may also consider supplementing their traditional liabil-
ity program with a new product providing worldwide coverage for
trademark infringement.1 2 1
In summary, the new age of cybertorts and e-commerce promise new
challenges to policyholders not contemplated by the drafters of the CGL
form in 1986, or even in its 1998 revision. For these reasons, policyholders
facing a significant risk of Internet-related trademark infringement claims
should consider a variety of new products offered by insurers expressly
designed for their needs. Part III of this Article describes some of these
new products.
III. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT: NEW PRODUCTS
Allegations of trademark infringement potentially can devastate a busi-
ness. In addition to facing the possibility of paying a large judgment, an
alleged infringer may also have to bear the considerable fees and costs of
defending against an infringement action. As discussed above, depending
on the allegations made against the alleged infringer, the remedies sought
and the forum in which the claim is disputed, the traditional CGL policy
may not afford complete coverage for a trademark infringement claim.
The standard CGL policy may also leave the alleged infringer in a lurch if
the action seeks only injunctive relief. And what about the trademark
holder seeking to protect itself from the improper use of its trademark by
others? While the trademark holder can bring legal action to enforce its
rights, the typical CGL policy provides no coverage for such expenses.
Fortunately, a number of insurance carriers offer products to fill certain
of the coverage gaps left by traditional CGL policies, both for defense
against infringement claims and prosecution of trademark infringement.
120. Insurance Services Office, Inc., Form CG 00 01 10 93; Form CG 00 01 07 98. The
limited international coverage provided by the portion of the definition not quoted herein
would not likely apply to an Internet-related trademark infringement claim.
121. E.g., Chubb Intellectual Property and Communications Liability Form 80-02-2080
(Ed. 1-99), discussed in Part III.B.1 of this Article.
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An overview of a representative sampling of these products follows. 122
A. ABATEMENT COVERAGE
A company that fails to enforce its trademark against infringement
runs the risk of losing its trademark rights in their entirety. Instituting a
legal action to protect one's trademark, however, can be costly. To defray
the costs of trademark enforcement, a number of carriers offer infringe-
ment "abatement" or "enforcement" coverage.
1. Coverage
While the terms of infringement abatement policies vary by carrier, the
general purpose of such policies is to reimburse the insured for litigation
expenses incurred in the enforcement of patents, trademarks or copy-
rights against an alleged infringer. The policy offered by Intellectual
Property Insurance Services Corp. ("IPIS") exemplifies the type of cover-
age available for infringement abatement.
In particular, the IPIS abatement policy provides reimbursement for
(1) litigation brought by the insured against the alleged wrongdoer, (2)
for infringement, (3) which began during the policy period. Additionally,
the policy affords coverage for so-called "invalidity counterclaims"
brought against the insured, in which the alleged infringer attempts to
invalidate the trademark at issue.
2. Conditions
Carriers offering abatement policies often require both that the infring-
ing act begin and that the insured file the claim during the policy period.
The IPIS abatement policy, for example, will cover only those infringe-
ment abatement actions commenced with the carriers' express authoriza-
tion. Among other requirements, the carrier may compel the insured to
provide detailed information regarding the alleged infringement, an esti-
mate of litigation expenses likely to be incurred, and an opinion by quali-
fied counsel that infringement has indeed occurred before the carrier will
authorize an enforcement action.'2 3
Further, abatement policies may only reimburse the insured for a cer-
tain percentage of the expenses incurred in the enforcement litigation.12 4
In the event that the insured ultimately obtains an award of attorney fees
122. Although many carriers now offer policies specifically targeting intellectual prop-
erty and Internet liability, this Article examines only a few of these products. This Article
also provides only a general overview of sample policies and does not address all of the
policies' coverage terms, conditions, or exclusions. Further, the terms of the sample poli-
cies addressed herein are subject to modification by the carriers, and may have been
changed since the time this Article was published.
123. See, e.g., the IPIS abatement policy.
124. According to Intellectual Property Insurance Services Corp.'s abatement policy,
for example, the Insured must pay a "coinsurance percentage" on certain litigation ex-
penses. Likewise, the abatement policy offered by Litigation Risk Management, Inc. pays
for 80% of the expenses incurred by the insured in an enforcement action.
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or costs in the trademark enforcement litigation, the policy may compel
the insured to share such award pro rata with the carrier, at least until the
carrier has recouped the amount it has paid in the litigation. 125 Unless
the insured secures an endorsement covering international infringement,
abatement policies may apply only to infringement occurring in the
United States.12 6 The global reach of the Internet poses a legitimate risk
of international infringement. Thus, policyholders should consider an in-
ternational endorsement.
3. Exclusions
Abatement policies may not cover acts of infringement which began
before the policy period, nor insure expenses incurred prior to initiation
of authorized enforcement litigation. 127 To the extent that a countersuit
is filed against the insured in the enforcement litigation, abatement poli-
cies will not likely cover liability for any judgment or damages awarded
against the insured. However, the insured's traditional liability policies,
including the CGL, may fill such gaps left by the abatement policy
coverage.
4. Limits
Depending on the premium amount the insured is willing to pay, in-
fringement abatement policies can be obtained with widely varying limits
of coverage. Intellectual Property Insurance Services, for instance, ad-
vertises infringement abatement policies with coverage limits of $100,000
to $5,000,000 per claim. 128
B. INFRINGEMENT COVERAGE
As discussed in Part II of this Article, courts across the country have
found coverage for some types of traditional trademark infringement
claims under standard CGL policies. However, based on restricting lan-
guage in the ISO policy form, the courts have restricted such coverage to
apply only to trademark infringement committed in the course of adver-
tising activities. CGL policies also have been held not to insure against
claims for purely injunctive relief. Additionally, faced with court deci-
sions requiring carriers to provide at least limited coverage for trademark
violations, certain carriers are now adding specific endorsements to liabil-
ity policies excluding coverage for most intellectual property violations.
An endorsement from Chubb Insurance Companies, for example, pro-
vides as follows:
This insurance does not apply to any liability arising out of or di-
rectly or indirectly related to: the actual or alleged publication or
utterances of oral or written statement of any type which is claimed
125. See, e.g., the IPIS abatement policy.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See IPIS website, at www.infringeins.com.
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as an infringement, violation or defense of any of the following rights
or laws:




4. trade secrets; or
5. trade mark or service mark or certification or collective mark or
trade name; other than trademarked or service marked titles or
slogans. 129
While such an exclusion would not bar coverage for infringement of
trademarks or service marks that are "titles or slogans," it would appear
to halt the trend toward expanding CGL coverage for trademark in-
fringement claims-at least of the unintentional variety-evidenced by
the 1986 and 1998 ISO revisions. In fact, it marks a return to exclusionary
language abandoned with the 1986 revision. 130
Increasingly then, insureds accused of trademark infringement may
find that their CGL policies provide limited coverage for infringement
actions brought against them. However, the recent proliferation of trade-
mark and other intellectual property infringement disputes spawned by
Internet usage has prompted insurance companies to develop policies
specifically targeted to intellectual property exposures. The following ex-
amples are representative of carriers' efforts to provide infringement cov-
erage that is excluded by, or at least questionable, under the CGL.
1. Example No. 1: Chubb Insurance Company's Intellectual Property
and Communications Liability Policy
Unlike the typical CGL coverage form, the newly developed intellec-
tual property policies, such as Chubb Insurance Company's Intellectual
Property and Communications Liability Policy ("IPCL Policy"), explicitly
identify trademark infringement as a covered offense:
Coverage A
[W]e will pay damages the insured becomes legally obligated to pay
by reason of liability imposed by law or assumed under an insured
contract arising out of any of the following Specified Offenses com-






129. See Chubb Commercial General Liability Form.
130. The exclusion of trademark infringement claims other than those involving "titles
or slogans" provided by the Chubb endorsement is substantively identical to the exclusion
added to the 1973 ISO form by endorsement in 1981, and omitted from the 1986 revision.




4. trademark, trade name or trade dress;
5. service mark or service name; or
6. patent' 3 '
In addition to expressly covering trademark infringement, the IPCL
Policy obligates the carrier to "defend the insured against a claim or suit
seeking damages or injunctive relief, or both, arising out of a Specified
Offense.' 132 The IPCL Policy thus fills the CGL policy's void with re-
spect to defense costs for injunctive relief actions.
With respect to coverage territory, the IPCL Policy applies to "Speci-
fied Offenses" committed "anywhere" in the world.133 The standard
CGL policy, by contrast, covers only those offenses taking place within
the United States. As noted above, the global reach of the Internet ex-
poses companies to an increased risk of international trademark infringe-
ment. Thus, the global coverage extended by the IPCL Policy could
prove significant, particularly for high-tech businesses.
2. Example No. 2: AIG netAdvantage CompletesM
Recognizing that companies which market or advertise on the Internet
are exposed to liability for the content they display or disseminate on
their web sites, certain carriers offer specific coverage for Internet adver-
tising and marketing liabilities. For example, through its netAdvantage sM
series of policies, AIG offers "Internet Media Liability Insurance," which
provides coverage as follows:
We shall pay on your behalf those amounts, in excess of the applica-
ble Retention, you are legally obligated to pay, including content-
based liability and liability assumed under contract, as damages, re-
sulting from any claim(s) made against you for your wrongful act(s)
in the display of Internet media. Such wrongful acts must occur dur-
ing the policy period. 134
The policy broadly defines "wrongful act(s)" to include "any actual or
alleged breach of duty, neglect, act, error, misstatement, misleading state-
ment, omissions that results in ... an infringement of copyright, domain
name, title, slogan, trademark, trade name, trade dress, mark or service
name, or any form of improper deep-linking or framing; plagiarism,
piracy or misappropriation of ideas under implied contract or other mis-
appropriation of property rights, ideas or information .... 1'35 "Internet
media," in turn, is defined as "any material on your Internet site, includ-
ing advertising."'' 36
Unlike the 1986 form CGL policy, which provides coverage for trade-
mark infringement only if the infringement arises out of an "advertising
131. See Chubb Intellectual Property and Communications Liability Form 80-02-2080
(Ed. 1-99) (emphasis added).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See AIG netAdvantage Complete" Form No. 78079 (6/01).




activity," the "Internet Media Liability Insurance" form covers trade-
mark infringement which occurs in the display of material on the In-
sured's Internet site, whether or not the infringement is advertisement-
related. 137
The "Internet Media Liability Insurance" form also obligates the car-
rier "to defend a 'suit' brought against [the insured]."' 138 The policy de-
fines "suit" to include "a civil or criminal proceeding for monetary, non-
monetary or injunctive relief, including "a binding arbitration proceeding
in which damages are alleged and to which you must submit or do submit
with our prior written consent."'1 39 Thus, the "Internet Media Liability
Insurance" form also exceeds the scope of coverage offered by a CGL
policy by protecting the insured against claims for purely injunctive relief,
and claims pending in an arbitration proceeding.
Like Chubb's IPCL policy, AIG's "Internet Media Liability Insurance"
bridges the "coverage territory" gap left by CGL policies in that it applies
to wrongful acts that occur, claims that are brought, and losses suffered
anywhere in the world. 140 Finally, in contrast to the typical CGL policy,
the Internet Media Liability Insurance Form includes "punitive, exem-
plary and multiple damages (where insurable by law)" in the definition of
"damages" covered by the policy.
IV. CONCLUSION
The world wide web has opened a floodgate of opportunity for individ-
uals and businesses alike. At the same time, the Internet has created un-
precedented exposure to virtually all businesses, particularly in the area
of trademark infringement. Businesses that avail themselves of the mar-
keting potential of the world wide web run the risk of infringing upon the
trademark of another. Businesses that abstain from using the web face
the risk that someone else will use the Internet to infringe upon their
trademarks. Either way, the increasing significance of insurance coverage
for the prosecution of and defense against Internet-related trademark in-
fringement is apparent.
As this Article has discussed, companies should first look to their CGL
policies in the event that they face liability for Internet-related trademark
infringement. The typical liability policy, however, may provide limited
coverage, or none at all, for certain types of trademark infringement
claims, and almost certainly will not cover the costs of prosecuting such
claims. Accordingly, businesses are well-advised to explore and consider
supplementing their existing liability programs with new insurance prod-
ucts on the market that are designed to fill at least some of the coverage
gaps arguably left by more traditional policies.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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